The Faragher and Ellerth Problem: Lower Courts\u27 Confusion Regarding the Definition of  Supervisor by Blackman, Stephanie Ann Henning
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 54 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - January 2001 Article 3 
1-2001 
The Faragher and Ellerth Problem: Lower Courts' Confusion 
Regarding the Definition of "Supervisor" 
Stephanie Ann Henning Blackman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephanie Ann Henning Blackman, The Faragher and Ellerth Problem: Lower Courts' Confusion Regarding 
the Definition of "Supervisor", 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 123 (2001) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol54/iss1/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
NOTES
The Faragher and Ellerth Problem:
Lower Courts' Confusion Regarding
the Definition of "Supervisor"
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 124
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND ......................................................... 127
A. Title VII ................................................................. 127
B. Pre-Faragher Case Law Defining the Term
"Supervisor" ........................................................... 128
1. The "Hiring, Firing, or Conditions of
Employment" Definition .............................. 130
2. The Paroline v. Unisys Corp. Twist .............. 132
C. Recent Decisions Affecting the Established Definition
of "Supervisor" ........................................................ 135
1. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton .................... 135
2. Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
E llerth ......................................................... 140
III. COURTS' CONFUSION FOLLOWING THE FARAGHER AND
ELLERTH DECISIONS .......................................................... 144
A. Courts Applying the Traditional Definition ............ 145
B. Courts Applying a Broader Definition of
"Supervisor" ........................................................... 149
IV. APPLYING THE BETTER DEFINITION: WHY THE TRADITIONAL
DEFINITION MAKES MORE SENSE IN THE TITLE VII
CONTEXT ........................................................................... 153
A. Positive Implications of Retaining the Traditional
D efinition ............................................................... 153
1. The Traditional Definition Better Fulfills
Legislative Intent ........................................ 153
2. Practical Implications of the Traditional
Versus a More Expansive Definition ............ 155
123
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
B. Importance of Adherence to the Doctrine of Stare
D ecisis .................................................................... 158
C. Consistency with Case Law Decided Under
Similar Employment Discrimination Statutes ........ 160
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act ........... 160
2. The Age Discrimination in Employment
A ct ............................................................... 161
V . CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 162
I. INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination law in the United States
changed drastically as a result of two Supreme Court decisions
handed down in June of 1998. In both Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton' and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,2 the Court held
that employers should be held vicariously liable for the unlawful
actions of supervisory employees in Title VII hostile environment
sexual harassment cases.3 Although these decisions revised and
clarified the proper standard of employer liability in hostile envi-
ronment claims, they also have been a source of confusion for lower
courts attempting to determine exactly which employees qualify as
supervisors. Consequently, lower courts have inconsistently decided
which employers should be held vicariously liable in hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment suits. 4
In early Title VII sexual harassment cases, federal courts ar-
ticulated a distinction between quid pro quo5 and hostile environ-
1. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
2. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Both Ellerth and Faragher were
decided on June 26, 1998. Id. at 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
3. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. As several scholars have thoroughly
addressed a harasser's individual liability in the Title VII context, this Note will not discuss that
issue. See generally Cristopher Greer, "Who, Me?" A Supervisor's Individual Liability for Dis.
crimination in the Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1835 (1994).
4. Compare Parkins v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that an employer should be held vicariously liable for the actions of employees who have
the power to hire or fire the plaintiff, or significantly control other decisions affecting the plain-
tiffs employment), with Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc. 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973 (D.
Minn. 1998) (holding that an employer should be held vicariously liable for the harassing actions
of a broader class of employees, even if the employees have authority only to delegate duties,
prepare performance evaluations, or make recommendations to discipline the plaintiff).
5. Quid pro quo harassment is defined by an exchange between the victim and the har-
asser: "Mhe woman must comply sexually with the harasser's demands or forfeit an employ-
ment opportunity." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 32
(1979).
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ment6 sexual harassment.7 Despite the distinction between forms
of sexual harassment, courts appropriately applied a uniform defi-
nition of the term supervisor." Nearly all cases defined a supervisor
as a person retaining significant input into hiring or firing deter-
minations or any other decisions affecting the conditions of the
plaintiffs employment.9
As sensible as this definition may seem, the Supreme Court
did not employ it expressly in the Faragher and Ellerth decisions.10
Instead, the Court proffered an extremely ambiguous definition for
the term supervisor."i In both cases, the Court defined a supervisor
as someone "with immediate (or successively higher) authority over
the employee."' 2
This vague definition has sparked much confusion in subse-
quent hostile environment cases. Some courts believe that the Su-
preme Court's vague definition was not meant to overrule the pre-
viously articulated definition of supervisor. These courts have con-
tinued to apply the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of em-
ployment" definition. 13 Other courts, however, have interpreted the
Supreme Court's "immediate (or successively higher) authority"
language as an intentional broadening of.the traditional meaning of
supervisor.14 These courts have effectively considered nearly any
employee higher than the plaintiff on the company's organizational
chart to be a supervisor.15
At first glance, this debate seemingly involves mere word
parsing, raising issues of perhaps little consequence. The definition
of supervisor, however, could have important practical effects in
6. Hostile environment sexual harassment is defined by "unwanted sexual advancements
... [like being] constantly felt or pinched, visually undressed and stared at... but never prom-
ised or denied anything explicitly connected with [conditions or terms of a) job.f Id. at 40. This
form of sexual harassment is also called "condition of work" harassment. See id.
7. These terms first appeared in academic literature. See id. at 32, 40. The Supreme
Court acknowledged this distinction in Meritor Sauings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986).
8. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying the
definition of supervisor used in both quid pro quo and hostile environment actions).
9. See, e.g., id.
10. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
11. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
12. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
13. See, e.g., Parkins v. Civil Constructors, 163 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 n.3 (7th Cir. 1998).
14. See, e.g., Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp.2d 953, 973 (D. Minn.
1998) Cignoring the traditional definition and applying the "immediate (or successively higher)
authority" definition introduced by Faragher and Ellerth).
15. See, e.g., id.
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future sexual harassment cases. 16 If lower courts apply the Su-
preme Court's definition literally, corporations could be creating
liability nightmares simply by appointing an employee as "team
leader," even if the new title carries little or no additional responsi-
bility.17 Additionally, applying a broader definition would be incon-
sistent with employment law claims arising under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, because cases decided under these similarly worded statutes
have used the traditional definition of supervisor. 18 Because the
Supreme Court did not intend to overrule the traditional "hiring
firing, or conditions of employment" definition of supervisor, lower
courts should apply this traditional definition in future Title VII
cases.
This Note begins in Part II by providing an overview of Title
VII, prior case law defining the term supervisor, and the Faragher
and Ellerth cases. Part III will explain the current division among
lower courts regarding the appropriate definition of supervisor to be
applied in hostile environment claims. Part IV will then explore the
benefits of using the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of em-
ployment" definition by examining the plain language of Title VII
and the practical implications of this narrower definition. This Sec-
tion will also explore the benefits of retaining the traditional defini-
tion for purposes of stare decisis, and it finally will discuss the rea-
sons why the traditional definition is more consistent with case law
decided under the American with Disabilities Act and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act.
16. Although Title VII uniformly applies to workplace discrimination based upon race, sex,
and religion, the issue of what constitutes a supervisor has predominantly arisen in the hostile
environment sexual harassment context. This issue arises in hostile environment cases more
frequently than quid pro quo harassment cases. In the quid pro quo scenario, conditions of the
victim's employment have been tangibly altered (or the victim has at least been threatened with
such consequences). Therefore, courts can reasonably assume that the harasser does indeed
occupy a supervisory position. Reasons why this issue has not frequently been litigated in the
context of racial or religious discrimination are uncertain. This is not to say, however, that the
issue will not be litigated in the future. See Alan R. Kabat et al., Racial and Sexual Harassment
Employment Law, 1997 A-L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 547, 601 (1999). Because Title VII
clearly encompasses such a broad range of workplace discrimination, judicial determinations
regarding the definition of supervisor are doubly important to employers.
17. See Paul E. Starkman, Learning the New Rules of Sexual Harassment: Faragher, El-
lerth and Beyond, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 317, 325 (1999).
18. See, e.g., Haltek v. Park Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Goodman v. Bd.
of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. 524, 498 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
[Vol. 54:1:123
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Title VH
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196419 broadly prohibits
discrimination in employment, including discrimination based upon
sex.20 Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2'
The text of Title VII does not specifically mention either quid
pro quo or hostile environment sexual harassment. The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission,22 however, has issued a series
of Title VII Interpretive Guidelines, which make clear that both
forms of sexual harassment are actionable under the statute.2 Al-
though the main purpose of Title VII is to prevent employers from
discriminating against employees in the workplace, this Note will
focus on the statute's definitional section. Section 2000e(b) defines
the term "employer."
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
19. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000e-17 (1994), makes
up only part of the entire body of law known as Title VII." Title VII also includes 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1994) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
21. Id.
22. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (CEEOC") is a federal agency respon-
sible for a number of functions. First, the EEOC is responsible for reviewing all Title VII com-
plaints and granting "right to sue" letters to those appearing to be valid. Sez 29 C.F.R. §
1604.19(a) (1997). Second, it has the power to develop uniform standards and policies defining
the nature of discrimination based upon race, religion, or sex. See Exec. Order No. 12,067, 43
Fed. Reg. 28,967 (1978). It is also responsible for issuing a series of Interpretive Guidelines
intended to assist courts in interpreting federal discrimination statutes. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a).
23. See id.; Misty L. Gill, Note, The Changed Face of Liability for Hostile Work Enuironment
Sexual Harassment: The Supreme Court Imposes Strict Liability in Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1651, 1669 (1999). Title
VII does not expressly grant the EEOC the authority to issue guidelines interpreting its text.
The EEOC, however, has nonetheless issued such Interpretive Guidelines, and some scholars
have argued that Title VII impliedly grants the EEOC such authority. See, eg., Rebecca Harmer
White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's
Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV., 51, 92-107 (1995).
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calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person.2 4
By including "agents" within the definition of employer, Congress
expressly incorporated the principle of respondeat superior into the
text of Title VII.25 Accordingly, a harasser need not necessarily be
an owner or president of a company in order for the company to be
legally responsible for sexual harassment.
B. Pre-Faragher Case Law Defining the Term "Supervisor"
Although courts have generally held employers liable for
their supervisors' quid pro quo harassment, courts did not always
allow plaintiffs to recover for hostile environment sexual harass-
ment. In Barnes v. Costle, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
was the first to hold that hostile environment sexual harassment is
a form of discrimination against women that violates Title VII.2 6
Since the Barnes decision, federal courts have consistently imputed
liability to employers for both quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment.27 Traditionally, though, federal courts have
treated the two types of claims differently. While holding employers
vicariously liable for quid pro quo harassment in the workplace, 28
most courts have employed a negligence standard29 in hostile envi-
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
25. See Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., No. 95-C-4906, 1997 WL 182279, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8,
1997). Although the text of Title VII uses the term "agent," courts have instead utilized the word
"supervisor." See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993). This
Note will follow courts' leads arid use the term "supervisor" rather than "agent." For Title VII
purposes, however, the two terms are identical in meaning.
26. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993-94 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Barnes, an administrative
assistant for the Environment Protection Agency claimed the director repeatedly asked her for
sexual favors at work. Id. at 984-85.
27. See, e.g., Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding in a sum-
mary judgment motion that the defendant may be held liable for hostile environment sexual
harassment); Gary v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 886 F. Supp. 78, 91 (D.D.C. 1995) (de-
nying defendant's summary judgment motion in a quid pro quo sexual harassment action).
28. See Highlander v. KF.C. Nael Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
29. In practice, courts have used a variety of standards for hostile environment cases,
ranging from an "aided by the agency relationship" standard to a negligence standard. See Eliza-
beth M. Brama, Note, The Changing Burden of Employer Liability for Workplace Discrimination,
83 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1494-96 (1999); see also Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harass-
ment Liability Under Agency Principals: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vin-
son, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1237-38 (1991). For reasons of clarity and simplicity, however, this
Note will refer to the standard simply as one of negligence. In the hostile environment context,
an employer is negligent only "if it knew or had reason to know of [a supervisor's] misconduct
and failed to take appropriate corrective action." Daulo v. Commonwealth Edison, 938 F. Supp.
1388, 1403 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (applying this standard in the context of racial discrimination). An
employer's knowledge that a supervisor had previously harassed other employees is highly role-
128
2001] THE FARAGHER AND ELLERTH PROBLEM
ronment cases. 3 0 These courts have generally reasoned that vicari-
ous liability simply makes more sense in quid pro quo cases, where
harassers rely upon their employer-given authority to hire, fire, or
promote in order to harass subordinate employees. 31 In the hostile
environment context, however, harassers act outside the scope of
their authority; they are acting in their own capacities rather than
utilizing their employer-delegated authority to hire, fire, or promote
other employees. 32
Traditionally, courts placed a heavier emphasis upon sexual
harassment by an employer's agents or supervisors than harass-
ment by a plaintiffs co-employees. 33 Utilizing traditional agency
principals to determine how much authority the employer delegated
to the harasser, they ascertained the appropriate standard of li-
ability accordingly. 34 If a harasser was entrusted with enough
authority to be considered a supervisor, plaintiffs benefited from a
lower sexual harassment liability standard.35 Significantly, though,
because neither Title VII nor the EEOC Guidelines had explained
how much authority was necessary before an employee could be
classified as a supervisor,36 courts were forced to make this deter-
mination themselves.
vant in deciding employer negligence. See Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107. In Paroline v. Unisys
Corp., for example, a supervisor had a history of harassing other employees and then made inap-
propriate comments to the plaintiff in the employer's presence. Id. at 107-08. The court reasoned
that the employer could infer from the supervisors comments that he planned to harass the
plaintiff, Id. at 108. The court, therefore, refused to grant the employer's motion for summary
judgment. Id.
30. See, e.g., Gary, 886 F. Supp. at 88. Courts formulated these differing standards of proof
completely independently. Title VII does not mention the phrases "quid pro quo" or "hostile
environment" harassment. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23. EEOC Interpretive
Guidelines are also unhelpful, stating only that vicarious liability in Title VII claims turns on
"the particular employment relationship and the job functions performed by the individual." 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1997). But see infra note 36.
31. See, e.g., Gary, 886 F. Supp. at 88.
32. See, e.g., id. Courts have generally considered the distinction between sexual harass-
ment assisted by employer-given authority versus harassment accomplished outside of the scope
of that authority to be one of substance. Presumably, these courts have reasoned that employers
have more control over the former type of harassment, because they make a conscious choice to
vest the harasser with the authority to make employment decisions. Because employers have far
less control over harassment occurring outside the scope of employer-given authority, courts
favored a more employer-friendly standard of liability in hostile environment cases.
33. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).
34. See, e.g., id.
35. See, e.g., id. (noting that because the harasser had enough agency authority to be con-
sidered a supervisor, the employer could be held vicariously liable for his quid pro quo harass-
ment; however, if the harasser had not possessed adequate agency authority, the plaintiff would
instead have been forced to prove that the employer was negligent).
36. The EEOC has attempted to define more closely the term supervisor in a set of
Guidances in order to assist its inspectors investigating Title VII claims. TITLE VII/EPA/ADEA
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1. The "Hiring, Firing, or Conditions of Employment" Definition
Before the Supreme Court handed down the Faragher and
Ellerth decisions, courts generally agreed that in order to qualify as
a supervisor, an employee must exercise "significant control over
the plaintiffs hiring, firing, or conditions of employment."37 The
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits expressly adopted
this definition.38 Justice Marshall's concurrence in the Supreme
Court's Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson decision also implic-
itly adopted this definition.3 9
An excellent illustration of courts' application of this defini-
tion is the Daulo v. Commonwealth Edison case from the Northern
District of Illinois.40 In Daulo, a mechanic employed by CoinEd
DIVISION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (2 Compliance
Manuat Series No. 915.002, June 18, 1999) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/harass-
ment.html. The Guidances classify an employee as a supervisor if "the individual has authority
to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions affecting the [plaintiffi; or the indi-
vidual has authority to direct the [plaintiffs] daily work activities." Id. at III.A. (emphasis in
original). This definition is identical to the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employ-
ment' definition of supervisor. See infra Part II.B. The Guidances, however, also argue that an
employee may qualify as a supervisor if "a supervisor. .. does not have actual authority over the
employee . . . but] the employee reasonably believed that the harasser had such power."
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES, infra, Part III.B. This subjective definition is much broader than
the traditional definition, because it considers nearly anyone higher on the employer's organiza-
tional chart to be a supervisor. See infra Part IV. The EEOC offers absolutely no authority for
this subjective definition. Importantly, however, EEOC Guidances are "hardly binding" upon
courts. Solieau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997). Courts looking to this
Guidance have not adopted the EEOC's unsupported, subjective definition. See Kent v.
Henderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d 628, 633 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
37. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125. Although courts did not say so explicitly, they probably bor-
rowed this language directly from the text of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2). Section
2000e-2(a)(1) says employers cannot "fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or other-
wise ... discriminate with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment" based upon that individual's race, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(emphasis added). Similarly, section 2000e-2(a)(2) makes unlawful any employer attempts to
"limit, segregate, or classify his employees.., in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em.
ployee" based upon race, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added).
38. See Pfau v. Reed 125 F.3d 927, 937 (5th Cir. 1997); Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125; Volk v. Color,
845 F.2d 1422, 1436 (7th Cir. 1988); Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987);
Highlander v. KIF.C. Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
39. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(arguing that "[a] supervisor's responsibilities do not begin and end with the power to hire, fire
and discipline employees") Justice Marshall limited this statement, however, by noting, "[w]here
. .. a supervisor has no authority over an employee, because the two work in wholly different
parts of the employer's business, it may be improper to find strict employer liability." Id. at 77.
40. Davlo v. Commonwealth Edison, 938 F. Supp. 1388 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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claimed another employee had harassed him because of his race.41
The alleged harasser held the title of "supervisor," which was the
lowest management level position at ComEd.42 The district court
noted that in order for CornEd to be held liable for the supervisor's
actions,, the supervisor "must be sufficiently 'high up' in the corpo-
rate hierarchy to be considered a part of its 'decision-making
level."'43 Applying the traditional definition of "supervisor," the
court held that the mechanic had the burden of proving that the
supervisor exercised significant control over his hiring, his firing, or
the conditions of his employment. 44
The court held that the mechanic did not prove that the su-
pervisor fit within the traditional definition. 45 It noted that al-
though the defendant held the title of supervisor, he did not have
the powers of most supervisory employees. 46 In particular, the su-
pervisor did not have the authority to hire, fire, demote, or promote
any other employee.47 While the supervisor did have the power to
make recommendations regarding hiring and firing decisions, the
court reasoned that such powers are an inherent part of virtually
any supervisor's job responsibilities, and such power alone does not
impute Title VII liability to employers.48 Finally, the court held
that the supervisor's power to issue informal warnings to lower
level employees did not qualify him as a supervisor for Title VII
purposes. 49 Therefore, the court refused to impose any liability
upon CornEd.50
The Daulo case is just one of many that expressly adopted
what is now known as the traditional definition of supervisor. Nu-
merous other federal district and circuit courts have also adopted
this definition. 51
41. Id. at 1392-94.
42. Id. at 1392.
43. Id. at 1401.
44. Id. (citing Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993)).
45. Id.
46. Id. The court noted that the supervisor was "nothing more than the lowest cog in





51. See, e.g., Jeifries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1229 n.7 (10th Cir. 1998); Harvey v. Blake,
913 F.2d 226, 227 (5th Cir. 1990); Ghassomians v. Ashland Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F. Supp. 2d 675,
688 n.11 (E.D. Ky. 1998); Coakley v. Intl Double Drive-Thru, Inc., No. 95-C-7675, 1993 WIL
157417, at *3 (N.D. IlL Mar. 31, 1998); Rivera v. Edenwald Contracting Co., No. 93 Civ. 8582,
1996 WL 240003, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1996); Shoemaker v. Metro Info. Serv. 910 F. Supp.
259, 264 (E.D. Va. 1996); Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1104-05 (D. Colo. 1985).
2001] 131
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2. The Paroline v. Unisys Corp. Twist
Although nearly all pre-Faragher cases adhered to the tradi-
tional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition, a few
courts arguably broadened this definition. The case most frequently
cited for broadening the standard definition of supervisor is Paro-
line v. Unisys Corp. 52
In Paroline, a word processor sued Unisys after another em-
ployee, Moore, made improper sexual advances toward her both on
and off of the job. 58 The court recognized that in order to hold Uni-
sys vicariously liable for Moore's actions, the word processor first
had to prove that Moore was a supervisor.5 4 After acknowledging
the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" defini-
tion of supervisor, the Fourth Circuit clarified the definition in two
respects. 55 First, it held that supervisory employees need not pos-
sess ultimate authority to hire or fire in order to be considered su-
pervisors for Title VII purposes.56 Secondly, it noted that an em-
ployee need not hold the title of supervisor as long as "the com-
pany's management approves or acquiesces in the employee's exer-
cise of supervisory control over the plaintiff."57
The court held that Moore could qualify as a supervisor for
Title VII purposes.58 It emphasized that although Moore did not
have the ultimate power to make hiring and firing decisions, he did
have significant input into such decisions.5 9 For example, Moore
participated in the word processor's interview, 60 recommended that
she be hired, and personally gave her work assignments on at least
one occasion. 61 Therefore, the court allowed the word processor to
proceed in her suit against Unisys. 62
52. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989). The main issue before the Paro-
line court was whether an employee (in addition to the employer) can be held individually liable
in sexual harassment suits. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. See supra
note 3.
53. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 102-03.




58. Id. (refusing to grant Unisys Corporation's motion for summary judgment).
59. Id.
60. The facts of the case show that Moore asked the word processor at least one question
during her interview, thereby demonstrating that he was not a passive bystander in the inter.
viewing process. Id. at 103.
61. Id. at 104.
62. Id. at 102.
[Vol. 54:1:123132
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The Paroline case arguably broadened the traditional defini-
tion of supervisor. While most courts have not expressly required
that supervisory employees possess ultimate authority over hiring
and firing, others have held that the power to merely recommend
hiring or firing is not enough to qualify an employee as a supervisor
for Title VII purposes. 6 3 At first glance, then, Paroline appears to
conflict with previous cases like Daulo. Under Paroline, an em-
ployee with the power to recommend that the plaintiff be hired or
fired could be classified as a supervisor. Under Daulo, however, the
power to make recommendations regarding hiring and firing is in-
sufficient to establish supervisory status.6
A closer examination of prior cases, however, indicates that
Paroline did little to alter or expand the traditional "hiring, firing,
or conditions of employment" definition of supervisor. Nearly all the
cases decided prior to Paroline noted that the accused employee
must simply exercise significant control over hiring and firing deci-
sions regarding the plaintiff; ultimate authority over such decisions
was not a requirement.65 In most cases, therefore, the phrase "sig-
nificant control" was incorporated into the traditional definition of
supervisor. Accordingly, the Paroline decision correctly focused not
only upon the actual agency powers of the harasser, but also upon
the harasser's influence over other management-level employees.6
The Paroline court sought only to emphasize to the "significant con-
trol' portion of the traditional definition of supervisor, rather than
to expand that definition. A careful review of the Paroline decision
reinforces this argument: the opinion focused on Moore's influence
over other managerial employees by noting that Moore participated
in the interviewing process, that he made a recommendation to hire
the word processor, and importantly, that upper management fol-
lowed his recommendation. 67 The court decided that Moore's re-
sponsibilities gave him significant control over the decision to hire
63. E.g., Daulo v. Commonwealth Edison, 938 F. Supp. 1388, 1401 (N.D. IIl. 1996); see ako
text accompanying notes 44-47.
64. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104; Daulo, 938 F. Supp. at 1401.
65. See, e.g., Tafioya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that an em-
ployee qualified as a supervisor even though he did not "have direct power to hire and fire per-
sonnel... [but] had control over the plaintiffs employment conditions") (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., Daulo, 938 F. Supp. at 1401. In the Daulo case, for example, the court did not
necessarily hold that the supervisor's lack of hiring and firing power was the only reason it re-
fused to impute liability to the employer. The court may have reasoned that the supervisor sim-
ply did not have significant control over the management level employees that retained ultimate
authority over such decisions. The court vaguely alluded to this idea by noting that the power to
make general recommendations regarding hiring and firing is "inherently part of virtually every
supervisor's responsibilities." Id.
67. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 103.
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the word processor; thus Moore qualified as a supervisor under the
traditional definition. The Paroline case, therefore, did not change
or broaden the traditional definition of supervisor. Instead, it
merely clarified the importance of the "significant control" language
within that definition. 68
The Fifth Circuit expressly conformed to the Paroline court's
reasoning in Pfau v. Reed.69 In Pfau, the plaintiff Pfau claimed that
her audit team supervisor had sexually harassed her.70 The court
held that the audit team supervisor did not qualify as a supervisor
for Title VII purposes. 71 While it emphasized that the audit team
supervisor could not hire or fire other employees, 72 the court also
noted that he simply did not exercise any significant control over
the terms of Pfau's employment.73 For example, the audit team su-
pervisor's powers were limited to recommending subordinate
awards or discipline7 4 and handling the procedural aspects of Pfau's
68. The Paroline decision was widely critiqued in subsequent cases, but these criticisms fo-
cused mainly on the liability of the individual harasser. See, e.g., Griswold v. Fresenius USA,
Inc., 964 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (stating that "the continuing viability of [the
Paroline] holding has been called into doubt"); see also Bryant v. Locklear, 947 F. Supp. 915, 917
(E.D.N.C. 1996) (noting that the Paroline decision has caused much confusion at the district
court level). The case, however, continued to be accepted for its explanation of the definition of
supervisor. See, e.g., Reinhold v. Virginia, 135 F.3d 920, 934 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998). For example,
the Reinhold v. Virginia case involved a school psychologist who was harassed by an employee
who was informally called her "immediate supervisor." Id. at 923. The court decided to apply
the law of Paroline, noting that "our discussion in Paroline concerning what constitutes supervi-
sory authority under Title VII... has not been undermined by subsequent case law and remains
good law." Id. at 934 n.4. Consequently, it held that the immediate supervisor fit within the
definition of supervisor for Title VII purposes. Id. at 934-35. The court noted that the supervisor
participated in interviewing and hiring staff members, could informally discipline subordinates,
evaluated staff members' job performances, and met regularly with other employees regarding
their work assignments and progress. Id. at 935. Therefore, even though the immediate super-
visor did not have the ultimate authority to hire, fire, or change the conditions of the psycholo-
gist's employment, the Fourth Circuit held that the Commonwealth could be held liable for the
immediate supervisor's actions. Id.
69. Pfau v. Reed, 125 F.3d 927, 937 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and vacated on other
grounds, 525 U.S. 801 (1998). This decision has been remanded to the district court level in
order to determine, in part, whether an audit team supervisor qualifies as a supervisor under
the Faragher and Ellerth definition. Pfau v. Reed, 167 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999).
70. Pfau, 125 F.3d at 930.
71. Id. at 937.
72. Id. The court noted that the Fifth Circuit had previously declined to impute employer
liability for the acts of supervisors lacking the ability to hire and fire subordinate employees. See
id. The court, however, cited with approval more recent cases that have utilized Paroline's "sig-
nificant contror' language. See id.
73. Id. The court expressly stated that "the minimal authority held by [the audit team su-
pervisor] falls short of such significant control." Id.
74. Id.
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termination.75 The court, again following the basic logic of Paroline,
held that these powers alone were not substantial enough to hold
the employer liable for the audit team supervisor's harassment.7 6
In summary, before the Supreme Court decided the Faragher
and Ellerth cases, courts generally attached Title VII liability to
employers only for the acts of supervisors who exercised significant
control over hiring, firing, or other conditions of the plaintiffs em-
ployment. The Paroline case did not alter or enhance the traditional
definition; instead, it had the sole effect of directing the attention of
subsequent courts to the "significant control" language in the origi-
nal definition of supervisor.
C. Recent Decisions Affecting the Established Definition of
"Supervisor"
Eventually, lower courts became confused as to the proper
standard of employer liability in hostile environment sexual har-
assment cases.77 In order to avoid problems stemming from this un-
certainty, many plaintiffs attempted to ensure a vicarious liability
standard for employers by characterizing their lawsuits as quid pro
quo claims or filing suit in more lenient jurisdictions. This push to
broaden the definition of quid pro quo alerted the Supreme Court,
which subsequently granted certiorari in Faragher and Ellerth, two
pending sexual harassment cases.78
1. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
In the Faragher case, the plaintiff worked part time and
during the summers as an ocean lifeguard for the City of Boca
Raton.79 During her employment,8 0 the plaintiff claimed that two of
her supervisors engaged in both quid pro quo and hostile work en-
vironment sexual discrimination.8 1
The city's Marine Safety division was structured in a "para-
military configuration" in which lifeguards, including the plaintiff,
75. Id. at 937 n.6. The court noted that handling the procedural aspects of the plaintiffs
termination is quite different from participating in the substantive decision to fire her. Id.
76. See id.
77. See supra note 29.
78. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. El-
lerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
79. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780.




reported to lieutenants and captains, among them David Silverman
and Robert Gordon.8 2 The lieutenants and captains were responsi-
ble for issuing the lifeguards' daily assignments and supervising
their fitness training.8 3 Lieutenants and captains, in turn, reported
to Bill Terry, the chief.84 The chief held the authority to hire new
lifeguards, supervise all work assignments, engage in counseling,
deliver oral reprimands, and make record of any disciplinary ac-
tions. 85 Although the city adopted a sexual harassment policy in
1986, it neglected to disseminate this policy to the Marine Safety
Division.86
The plaintiff alleged that Terry repeatedly touched her and
other female lifeguards without invitation.87 Additionally, Terry
allegedly made crude gestures and demeaning comments directed
at the female lifeguards. 88 Silverman engaged in similar types of
activities: on one occasion, he made sexual comments directed at
the plaintiff, and he repeatedly made crude gestures and vulgar
references within earshot of the female lifeguards. 89
The plaintiff did not file any complaints with the city re-
garding the behavior of Terry and Silverman.90 She spoke with
Gordon about the harassment, but she did not consider these con-
versations to be formal complaints. 91 Other female lifeguards had
similar conversations with Gordon, but he did not report these con-
versations to Terry or any other city official. 92
Based upon these facts, the district court concluded that
Terry and Silverman engaged in quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment.93 The court held the city vicariously liable
for Terry and Silverman's actions for three reasons. First, the har-
assment was pervasive enough to support an inference that the city
82. Id. at 781. Silverman held the title of lieutenant from 1985, until he was promoted to




86. Id. at 781-82.
87. Id. at 782. The plaintiff alleged that Terry repeatedly put his arm around her and
touched her buttocks. Id.
88. Id. For example, Terry once made disparaging comments about the plaintiffs body, and
he also asked a female interviewing for a position as a lifeguard whether she would be willing to




92. Id. at 783.
93. Id.
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had "knowledge, or constructive knowledge" of the harassment.9
Second, traditional agency principles supported the city's liability
because Terry and Silverman were acting as its agents when the
harassment occurred. 95 Finally, Gordon's knowledge of the harass-
ment, combined with his inaction, supported a decision to hold the
city liable.96 The court then awarded Faragher one dollar in nomi-
nal damages for her Title VII claim.97
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
versed the judgment of the district court.98 The court of appeals
concluded that although Terry and Silverman were obviously liable
for quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment, the
city could not be held liable for their actions.9 9 The panel held that
Terry and Silverman were not acting within the scope of their em-
ployment when they harassed the plaintiff; that their harassment
was not aided by their agency relationship with the city, and that
the city had no constructive knowledge of the harassment. 00 The
entire Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted the paners conclu-
sions. 01
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's
decision. 10 2 It held that employers should be held vicariously liable
for the acts of their supervisory employees in both quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment cases.103 The Court rea-
soned that several theories supported this holding.1°4 First, when
supervisors make decisions, they "merge" with their employers; the
decisions then exist as if the employers had made them directly. 105
The Court also found vicarious liability appropriate because super-
visors act within the scope of their authority when making dis-




97. Id. The court held that Faragher was not entitled to any compensatory damages be-
cause the harassment took place before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1564 (S.D. Fla.
1994). Faragher did not seek reinstatement or an injunction against the city. Id. at 1565. The
court, however, did award Faragher $10,000 in compensatory damages for her claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1568.
98. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 783.
99. Id. at 784.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 810. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 780.
103. Id. at 807.




ees.10 6 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the agency relationship
actually helps supervisors engage in sexual harassment.10 7 But for
supervisors' authoritative positions, in other words, they might be
unable to harass other employees at all. 08
Additionally, the Court looked to traditional agency stan-
dards articulated by the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 109 Section
219(1) of the Restatement provides that "a master is subject to li-
ability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the
scope of their employment." 0 Courts of appeals have typically as-
sumed that sexual harassment falls outside the scope of any super-
visor's employment."' The Court noted, however, that this reason-
ing is inconsistent with other cases dealing with the agency rela-
tionship between employers and their employees. 112 Employers, for
example, have been held vicariously liable for intentional torts such
as battery" 3 because such acts are considered to be among "the
normal risks to be borne by the business in which the servant is
employed."" 4 The Court also noted that supervisors are responsible
for maintaining a safe and productive work environment. 115 There-
fore, any actions taken by a supervisor to alter the work atmos-
phere, including harassing subordinates, can be considered to be
within the scope of employment. 116
The Faragher Court further held that Section 219(2)(d) of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency could be applied to sexual har-
assment claims.117 Section 219(2)(d) states that an employer is li-
able for torts committed by employees acting outside the scope of
their employment if "the servant purported to act or speak on be-
half of the principal and there was reliance on apparent authority,
or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation."" 8 The Court noted that the comments accompa-
106. Id. at 791. Importantly, the Court simply assumed that all employees considered su-
pervisors under Title VII have the employer-given authority to hire, fire and promote. Id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 793 (quoting and adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958)).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (emphasis added).
111. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793.
112. Id. at 794-95.
113. E.g., Leonbruno v. Chaplain Silk Mills, 192 A-D. 858, 859 (1920) (holding an employer
liable when one employee threw an apple at another employee and caused his eye to hemor-
rhage).
114. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 795.
115. Id. at 798.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 802.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 110, at §219(2)(d).
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nying Section 219(2)(d) clearly state that the section applies to
cases "in which tortious conduct is made possible or facilitated by
the existence of the actual agency relationship."11 9
By relying upon these agency principles, the Court reasoned
that employers should be held vicariously liable when their employ-
ees abuse supervisory authority. 120 Importantly, the Court defined a
supervisor as someone "with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee."121
In an attempt to soften the blow to employers, the Faragher
Court also set forth an affirmative defense for vicarious liability
claims in which the supervisor's harassment did not result in a tan-
gible employment action1 22 against the plaintiff.m The Court held
that the defense has two prongs: first, the employer must exercise
reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing be-
havior; and second, the plaintiff must have unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any opportunities offered by the employer or un-
reasonably failed to otherwise avoid harm. 24
Applying this reasoning, the Court held the City of Boca
Raton liable for Terry and Silverman's harassing conduct.'1 The
Court noted that both Terry and Silverman had "virtually un-
checked authority" over the lifeguards, and that they directly con-
trolled all of Faragher's day-to-day activities126 Both men, there-
119. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219, Comment e,
which states that an employer should be held liable when "the servant may be able to cause
harm because of his position as agent, as where a telegraph operator sends false messages pur-
porting to come from third persons").
120. Id. at 807.
121. Id. This Note assumes that the Court used this language in order to define the word
supervisor. Plausibly, however, the Court may not have been attempting to proffer a definition
at all Instead, the Court might have been attempting to articulate a test to determine when an
employer is to be held liable for the harassing conduct of a supervisor or agent. This Note, how-
ever, argues that the Court was in fact attempting to define the term supervisor because the
"immediate (or successively higher) authority" clause is placed directly after the term supervisor,
indicating that the phrase simply modifies and explains that word. See id.
122. A tangible employment action includes any discriminatory employment act with tangi-
ble consequences, like the denial of a job, firing and demotion. Id. at 804-05. The Court ex-
panded upon this definition in the Ellerth case. See infra text accompanying notes 161-69.
123. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
124. Id. This affirmative defense has been critiqued by some commentators as being incon-
sistent with agency principles. See, e.g. Jennifer T. De Witt, Note, Defining Employer Liability:.
Toward A Precise Application of Agency Principals in Title VH Sexual Harassment Cases, 29
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 235,273-74 (1999).




fore, qualified as supervisors for Title VII purposes. 127 Next, the
Court found that the degree of hostility within the Marine Safety
Division had risen to an actionable level. 128 The Court concluded
that the city could not meet either prong of the affirmative defense
because it had completely failed to disseminate the sexual harass-
ment policies to the Marine Safety Division. 12 9 Additionally, the
city's policy did not include any assurance that harassing supervi-
sors could be bypassed when filing complaints. 130 As a result, the
Court remanded the case in order to reinstate the district court's
decision.131
2. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
On the same day it decided Faragher, the Supreme Court
also handed down a second decision, Ellerth, with nearly identical
reasoning. In Ellerth, the plaintiff worked as a salesperson for
Burlington. 132 The plaintiff claimed that one of Burlington's mid-
level managers repeatedly subjected her to both quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment during the course of her
employment. 13
Burlington organized its employees in a complicated corpo-
rate hierarchy.13 4 The entire corporation was divided into eight di-
visions, and each division was split into a number of business
units. 135 The plaintiffs former division was separated into five
business units. 136
Ted Slowik was the vice president of the plaintiffs business
unit. Slowik held the title of "mid-level manager." 37 He had the
127. Id. Terry had the authority to hire, discipline, and supervise Faragher's activities; Sil.
verman was responsible for giving Faragher daily assignments and supervising her fitness
training. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 808-09.
130. Id. at 808.
131. Id. at 810. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. Id. In his opinion, Jus-
tice Thomas reasoned that an employer should be held to a negligence, rather than vicarious
liability, standard for hostile environment harassment by supervisory employees. Id. Because
Faragher's employment was not tangibly affected by the harassment, Justice Thomas believed
that the city should not have been held vicariously liable for Terry and Silverman's actions. Id.
132. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998). Burlington is a corporation
that operates 50 plants and employs some 22,000 people across the United States. Id.
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authority to make hiring and promotion decisions, subject to the
approval of his supervisor. 18  Slowik's position was "not considered
an upper-level management position' and he was not part of the
"decision-making or policy-making hierarchy."139 Slowik was not the
plaintiffs immediate supervisor; instead the plaintiff answered to
an office colleague in Chicago, and the colleague in turn answered
to Slowik in New York.14°
The plaintiff claimed that Slowik repeatedly made offensive
remarks and gestures in her presence.141 The plaintiff usually did
not respond to Slowik's actions, but on one occasion she told Slowik
that a comment he made was inappropriate.1 4 2 She did not report
any of Slowik's conduct to any other authority figures at Burling-
ton, despite her awareness of the corporation's sexual harassment
complaint procedures. 143
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois con-
cluded that Slowik was a supervisor; it held that he created a hos-
tile environment but did not engage in quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment.144 Applying a negligence standard, it therefore held that
Burlington neither knew nor should have known about Slowik's
conduct. 145 The court noted that the plaintiff had not taken the
proper steps to report Slowik's behavior. 4 6 Accordingly, it granted
summary judgment in favor of Burlington. 147
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed the district court's decision. 14 8 Unable to agree upon
a single line of reasoning, the court issued eight separate opinions,
with a majority of the judges agreeing that the plaintiffs claim
could be categorized as quid pro quo discrimination. 149 Presumably,
the judges also agreed that Slowik was a supervisor for Title VII
138. Id. Burlington required Slowik's supervisor to sign all paperwork involved with the
hiring and promotion decisions. Id.
139. Id. Slowik's supervisor was the first to describe Slowik's job in these exact terms. See
id.
140. I&
141. Id. at 748. Slowik allegedly made comments about the plaintiffs breasts, threatened
that he could "make [the plaintiffs] life very hard or very easy at Burlington." and told the plain-
tiff she was not "loose enough" during a promotion interview. Id.
142. Id. at 749.
143. Id. at 748-49.
144. See id. at 749. The court recognized that the plaintiffs claim did have a quid pro quo






149. See id. at 749-50.
2001]
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
purposes. 150 The judges disagreed, however, on the proper standard
of employer liability. 151
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals'
decision. 5 2 As in Faragher, the Court held that employers should be
held vicariously liable for the acts of their supervisors in both quid
pro quo and hostile environment cases. 158 The Court also utilized
the "immediate (or successively higher) authority" definition ar-
ticulated in Faragher.154
The Court reasoned that "quid pro quo" and "hostile envi-
ronment," the two categories of sexual harassment, were no longer
controlling on the issue of vicarious liability.155 Instead, the Court
reasoned that all harassment should be controlled by a vicarious
liability standard. 56
As in the Faragher case, the Court quoted the Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) for the proposition that employers
should be held vicariously liable for the acts of their employees
when the employee "was aided in accomplishing the tort by the ex-
istence of the agency relation."157 The Court also noted that appar-
ent authority analyses are irrelevant in the Title VII context. 158 Ap-
150. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1997), aff'd sub noma.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). None of the opinions expressly discussed
the definition of supervisor or whether Slowik- constituted a supervisor for Title VII purposes.
Because they discussed and applied only the standards of liability for harassment by supervisory
employees, however, the opinions implied that Slowik was, in fact, a supervisor. See id. at 496
(noting, in the majority opinion, that "employers [are] strictly liable for the quid pro quo harass-
ment perpetrated by their supervisory employees" (emphasis added)).
151. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 750. Judges Flaum, Cummings, Bauer, and Evans generally agreed
that vicarious liability was the proper standard, because the case involved quid pro quo sexual
harassment. See Jansen, 123 F.3d at 503. Judges Wood and Rovner applied agency principals to
impose vicarious liability on employers for almost all sexual harassment, whether it be in quid
pro quo or hostile environment form. Id. at 566. Judge Kanne held that the plaintiff did state a
quid pro quo claim, but he applied a negligence standard because the harassment involved only
threats and not tangible job detriments. Id. at 505. Judge Easterbrook held that Slowik's ac-
tions did not constitute quid pro quo harassment and applied the controlling state law to hold
Burlington liable. Id. at 555. Chief Judge Posner, joined by Judge Manion, concurred in part
and dissented in part, holding that the plaintiff had not established a case for quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment. See id. at 515. Posner therefore applied a negligence standard. Id. at 515.
Finally, Judge Coffey concurred in part and dissented in part, rejecting all of the above ap-
proaches and holding that a negligence standard should be consistently used both in quid pro
quo and hostile environment claims. Id. at 546-47.
152. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 746.
153. Id. at 764-65.
154. Id. at 765.
155. Id. at 754, 765.
156. Id. at 765.
157. Id. at 759.
158. Id. at 759-60.
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parent authority problems arise when supervisors exercise powers
they do not have. Title VII cases, in contrast, occur when supervi-
sory employees misuse power they actually do have. 15 9 Therefore,
the court noted that the agency relation rule, not apparent author-
ity analysis, is appropriate in Title VII cases. 160
In the context of agency analysis, the Court articulated two
common types of sexual harassment scenarios: one in which the
harassment results in a tangible employment action, and one in
which the harassment does not culminate in a tangible employment
action.16' The Court defined a tangible employment action as "a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different re-
sponsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in bene-
fits." 16 2 It recognized that only an employee acting within the
authority of the company can cause a tangible employment
injury. s63 Such actions require an official act of the enterprise, such
as documentation in company records, as well as review and ap-
proval by higher-level supervisors.'64 Accordingly, the Court held
that a supervisor's harassment that culminates in a tangible em-
ployment action automatically results in vicarious liability for the
employer. 65
In the second harassment scenario, in which harassment
does not result in a tangible employment injury, the Court noted
that employer liability is less certain. 166 For example, in some
situations supervisors may automatically be aided by the agency
relationship because their power and authority make their threats
particularly powerful. 67 In other situations, however, where super-
visors simply act as co-workers, their supervisory powers might not
play any role in the harassment. 16 Accordingly, the Ellerth Court
held that when the supervisor's harassment does not result in a
159. See id. at 759.
160. Id. at 760.
161. Id. at 763.
162. Id. at 761. The Coures definition of a tangible employment action resembles the defini-
tion of quid pro quo sexual harassment See supra note 5. Although the Court claimed to have
shifted away from the quid pro quo/hostile environment distinction, the adjustment in analysis
arguably did not result in any practical differences.
163. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 762-63. The Court noted that this decision is consistent with its ruling in the






tangible employment action, the employer may raise the two-prong
affirmative defense articulated in Faragher.6 9
Applying this holding to the case at hand, the Ellerth Court
affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision. 1 0 The Court noted that be-
cause Ellerth did not allege that Slowik had taken any tangible
employment actions against her, Burlington would presumably be
entitled to raise the newly articulated affirmative defense.171 Rec-
ognizing that the Faragher and Ellerth holdings constituted a sig-
nificant shift in Title VII case law, the Court remanded the case to
the district court to determine whether Ellerth should have the op-
portunity to amend her pleadings or engage in more discovery.172
As a result of the Faragher and Ellerth holdings, quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment cases now exist on
essentially level playing fields: in both types of cases, employers are
held vicariously liable for the harassing actions of their supervisory
employees. As subsequent decisions have revealed, however, these
cases have not completely eliminated the confusion and uncertainty
in sexual harassment case law.
III. COURTS' CONFUSION FOLLOWING THE FARAGHER AND
ELLERTH DECISIONS
Although Faragher and Ellerth resolved the conflict regard-
ing the proper standard of employer liability in hostile environment
cases, they have potentially created a separate problem. In subse-
quent cases, lower courts have struggled to determine whether the
Supreme Court, by defining a supervisor as someone "with immedi-
ate (or successively higher) authority over the employee," intended
to overrule and broaden the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions
of employment" definition. In the context of determining an em-
169. Id. at 765. The defense has two elements: 1) the employer took reasonable care to pre-
vent and correct any harassment, and 2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any of these preventative or corrective opportunities. See id. at 765; see also supra text accom-
panying notes 122-24.
170. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766.
171. Id.
172. Id. Justice Ginsburg filed a brief concurring opinion clearly articulating that the labels
quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment are no longer controlling in Title VII
cases. Id. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. Id. at 766-74. As in his Faragher
dissent, Justice Thomas believed that any harassment not resulting in a tangible employment
action makes the application of a negligence standard, rather than a strict liability standard,
appropriate. Id. at 767.
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ployer's liability for punitive damages under Title VII,'"3 the Court
has indicated that it did not intend to broaden the traditional defi-
nition.174 Accordingly, most courts have responded by applying the
"hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition of supervi-
Sor.175 A number of notable district court decisions, however, have
employed the new definition, holding that the Supreme Court did in
fact intend to broaden the traditional definition. 176
A. Courts Applying the Traditional Definition
One year after the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, the Su-
preme Court indicated that it did not intend to overrule the tradi-
tional definition of supervisor. 177 In Kolstad v. American Dental As-
sociation, the Court held that punitive damages may be awarded in
Title VII cases even when an employer has not engaged in "egre-
gious" discrimination. 178 Although this holding is seemingly irrele-
vant in the determination of supervisory status, the Court noted in
its reasoning that an employer should be held liable for punitive
damages when the harasser acts in a "managerial capacity." 179 The
Court expressly recognized that "'no good definition of what consti-
tutes 'managerial capacity' has been found."' 180 It noted that in de-
termining managerial or supervisory status, courts should examine
an employee's actual authority, avoiding mere reliance upon his or
her job title alone. 181 Here the Court made no mention of the "im-
mediate (or successively higher) authority" language of Faragher
and Ellerth. Even though the Court did not expressly adopt the
"hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition, it seemingly
173. Technically, the Court decided when punitive damages are appropriate under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, a part of Title VII. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999); see also
supra note 19.
174. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544; see also infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., Parkins v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1998). At
least one legal source has argued that the Farogher and Ellerth definition does not change the
standard of employer liability for its supervisors' sexual harassment. See Jules L. Smith &
Harry B. Bronson, Avoiding and Litigating Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1998 Supreme
Court Decisions: Ellerth, Faragher, and Oncale, 606 P.LL LITIG. 289, 316 (1999) (noting that
"no matter what nomenclature is used... [s]upervisory authority includes: (i) the authority to
take or take part in employment action for or against the employee;... (iii) the ability to alter
the terms or conditions of the employee's employmen").
176. E.g., Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953 (D. linn. 1998).
177. See Kostad, 527 U.S. at 543.
178. Id. at 538.
179. Id. at 543.
180. Id. (citing JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LNW AND




advocated this type of inquiry when determining supervisory
status. Accordingly, a majority of courts, including the Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits, have continued to utilize the traditional
"hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition of supervi-
sor. 1
82
In Parkins v. Civil Constructors, Inc., a truck driver claimed
she had been harassed by two of Civil Constructors' foremen. 183
The Seventh Circuit first recognized that in order to hold the com-
pany liable, the foremen must qualify as supervisors for Title VII
purposes. 84 The court noted that before Faragher and Ellerth, the
Seventh Circuit had "made an effort to maintain a line between
low-level supervisors who were the equivalent of coworkers and su-
pervisors whose authority and power was sufficient to make conse-
quential employment decisions affecting the subordinate."'181 In
those prior cases, an employee's ability to significantly control hir-
ing, firing or other conditions of the plaintiffs employment was suf-
ficient to establish a supervisory relationship in the Title VII con-
text.186 The court noted that circuit court cases subsequent to
Faragher and Ellerth have also focused upon the strength and ex-
tent of the employee's power. 8 7 As a result, the court held,
[I]t is manifest that the essence of supervisory status is the authority to affect the
terms and conditions of the victim's employment. This authority primarily consists
of the power to hire, fire, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee. Absent an
182. See, e.g., Summerville v. Ross/Abbott Lab., No. 98-3517, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21009, at
*34 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 1999); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 593
(5th Cir. 1998); Parkins v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998).
183. Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1031. The foremen allegedly brought a pornographic picture to
work, made inappropriate comments, and touched the plaintiff on two separate occasions. Id.
184. Id. at 1033.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1031 n.1.
187. Id. at 1034 (citing Deffenbaugh-Williams, 156 F.3d at 592); Lissau v. Southern Food
Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1998); Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 888
(8th Cir. 1998). In fact, only one of these cases actually supports the court's proposition. The
Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. case addressed the supervisor issue and subse-
quently held that the defendant was a supervisor because of his authority to fire the plaintiff.
Deffenbaugh-Williams, 156 F.3d at 593. Although the Deffenbaugh-Williams court did not cite
any pre-Faragher cases for that proposition, the Parkins court could have reasonably concluded
that the Fifth Circuit intended to adopt the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employ-
ment" definition. The other two cases, Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp. and Lissau v. Southern Food
Service, clearly do not adopt this position. For example, in Phillips, whether or not the alleged
harasser was the plaintiffs supervisor was not even an issue in the case, because "there [wa]s no
question that [the harasser] was [the plaintiffs] supervisor at the time the alleged harassment
occurred." Phillips, 156 F.3d at 886, 888. The Parkins courts citation to Lissau is even more
tenuous, because the Lissau case did not even address or mention the alleged harasser's rela-
tionship to the plaintiff Instead, the court simply assumed that the harasser was a supervisor.
Lissau, 159 F.3d at 181-82.
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entrustment of at least some of this authority, an employee does not qualify as a
supervisor for purposes of imputing liability to the employer. IE
The Parkins court thus articulated a definition of supervisor nearly
identical to the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employ-
ment" definition.
Under the traditional definition, the court found that the
foremen were not supervisors. 89 The court reasoned that because
each foreman rotated between acting as a foreman and performing
ordinary labor duties, neither of the men performed the work of a
traditional "foreman" on a regular basis. 190 Additionally, one of the
foremen was not even employed full-time by Civil Constructors: he
worked only six or seven months per year.191 The court also recog-
nized that a traditional "foreman" simply did not possess enough
authority to be considered a supervisor for Title VII purposes. 192
Foremen were merely union workers who told truck drivers where
to dump or pick up new loads; they did not decide the work to be
done at a site or assign employees to their crews.1 93 The court also
found persuasive the fact that the plaintiff did not even work exclu-
sively at the two foremen's sites, so "any authority they had over
[the truck driver] was tenuous at best."194
Although three circuits have addressed this issue, 195 a de-
termination of whether an employee is or is not a supervisor for Ti-
tle VII purposes is usually determined at the district court level. 96
The Gordon v. Southern Bells, Inc. case offers what is perhaps the
most explicit adoption of the traditional definition of supervisor by
a district court. 197 In Gordon, an advertising representative claimed
that two people within Southern Bells Corporation, a co-owner and
188. Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1034 (emphasis added).
189. Id.
190. Id. One of the alleged harassers testified that he acted as a foreman when enough work





195. See supra note 182.
196. See Brian C. Baldrate, Note, Agency Law and The Supreme Court's Compromise on
"Hostile Environment"Sexual Harassment in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1149, 1176 (1999). Presumably, this phenomenon exists
because district courts are charged with factual determinations. Once a court decides exactly
what powers an alleged harasser possesses in the workplace, the determination whether the
harasser is or is not a supervisor logically follows.
197. Gordon v. Southern Bells, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 966, 980-81 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (stating that




a district manager, had sexually harassed her.198 The district court
held that while the co-owner qualified as a supervisor for Title VII
purposes, the district manager did not.19e In its analysis, the court
first articulated Faragher and Ellerth's "immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee" definition of supervisor. 200 In
interpreting this definition, though, the court subsequently noted
that "[t]he touchstone for determining supervisory status is the ex-
tent of authority possessed by the purported supervisor [and]the
essence of this examination is to determine... 'the power to hire, fire,
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline the employee."' 201 In ap-
plying the traditional definition of supervisor, the court held that
the co-owner clearly qualified as a supervisor because he had com-
plete authority to affect all terms of the advertising representative's
employment. 20 2 In contrast, the court held that the district man-
ager could not be considered a supervisor because he had no
authority to significantly control any actions adverse to the adver-
tising representative, including an evaluation or review of her job
performance. 203 Thus, the Gordon case clearly interprets the lan-
guage in Faragher and Ellerth as neither changing nor broadening
the traditional definition of the term supervisor. 20 4
The majority of circuit and district courts recently charged
with determining the appropriate definition of supervisor have
agreed that the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employ-
ment" definition still applies in Title VII cases. 205 A number of
198. Id. at 970, 972.
199. Id. at 981.
200. Id. at 980.
201. Id. (citing Parkins v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998)).
202. Id. at 981.
203. See id.
204. The Gawley v. Indiana University case also explicitly adopted the traditional definition
of supervisor. Gawley v. Indiana Univ., No. IP 96-0466-C-M/S (S.D. Ind. 1998). In Gawley, a
police officer claimed that a lieutenant assigned to another department had sexually harassed
her. Id. at 4. The district court held that the lieutenant could not be considered the plaintiffs
supervisor. Id. As in Gordon, the court first articulated the "immediate (or successively higher)
authority" definition of supervisor articulated by the Faragher and Ellerth cases. Id. at 3. Next,
the court noted that this definition was really just another way of phrasing the traditional "hir-
ing, firing, or conditions of employment" definition. Id. Applying the traditional definition to the
facts, the court refused to hold Indiana University liable for the lieutenant's actions. Id. at 4.
The court noted that the lieutenant "could not hire, fire, or discipline Plaintiff... never evalu-
ated Plaintiffs performance... [and] was not even in Plaintiffs chain of command." Id.
205. The cases mentioned thus far are certainly not an exhaustive list. See Bullman v. Pen-
ske Truck Leasing Co., No. IP 99-0158-C-T/G, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9527, at *25 (S.D. Ind. June
23, 2000) (citing Parkins for proposition that a supervisor is an employee with the power to "hire,
fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline [the victim]"); Jackson v. T & N Van Serv., 86 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has not specifi-
148 [Vol. 54:1:123
TUE FARAGHER AND ELLERTH PROBLEM
courts, however, dispute this holding, applying a more expansive
definition of supervisor in the wake of Faragher and Ellerth.
B. Courts Applying a Broader Definition of "Superuisor"
Some courts have interpreted the dicta in Faragher and El-
lerth as broadening the traditional definition of supervisor. Their
opinions suggest that the "immediate (or successively higher)
authority" definition of supervisor has effectively overruled, or at
least significantly broadened, the traditional definition. Accord-
ingly, these courts have purported to consider a larger number of
employees to be supervisors for Title VII purposes. To date, no cir-
cuit court has adopted this broader definition; it is a position taken
only by a few district courts.
In Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Center, Inc., for in-
stance, the court expressly adopted a broader definition of the term
supervisor.206 In Grozdanich, a staff nurse claimed that a "charge
nurse" at Leisure Hills had sexually harassed her.2 07 The court held
that the charge nurse qualified as a supervisor for Title VII pur-
poses. 208 The court first examined the traditional "hiring, firing, or
conditions of employment" definition of supervisor20 9 and noted that
under this definition, the charge nurse could not be considered a
supervisor because he could not hire, fire, promote, or increase
wages of other staff nurses.210
The court held, however, "it is evident that the Supreme
Court views the term 'supervisor' as more expansive than including
those employees whose opinions are dispositive on hiring, firing,
cally defined the term supervisor for purposes of determining an employer's liability... the
Court has described the power to supervise as 'to hire, fire, and to set work schedules and pay
rates' "); Kent v. Henderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that an employee
who did not have the power to hire, fire, reassign, or demote the victim was not a supervisor);
Mackay v. Rayonier, Inc., No. 3:96cv1582, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21108, at *19 (D. Conn. Aug.
31, 1999) (rejecting a supervisory definition that looks only to the harasser's status on a company
organizational chart); Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch. Dist, No. 96-6236, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
727, at *31-34 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1999) (finding that the defendant's supervisory status was an
issue of material fact because he had the power to change the nature and character of the plain-
tiffs work assignments, and he may have had significant input into the plaintiffs hiring and
firing); Cavuoti v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 735 A.2d 548, 559-61 (N.J. 1999) (analogizing the
definitions of supervisor articulated in Title VII sexual harassment cases to determine the cor-
rect definition of supervisor under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination).
206. Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Ctr., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973 (D. Minn. 1998).
207. Id. at 961-62 (noting that staff nurses were to report complaints of harassment either to
the charge nurse of the Director of Nursing).
208. Id. at 973.
209. Id. at 971.
210. Id. at 972.
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and promotion."211 As support for this proposition, the court noted
that in Faragher, the city was held vicariously liable for the acts of
Silverman, who acted as a "captain" in the Marine Safety
Division.212 The court noted that Silverman did not have the sole
authority to hire or fire the plaintiff in Faragher; instead, he had
the power only to issue her daily assignments and supervise her
fitness training. 213
The Grozdanich court reasoned that a more expansive defi-
nition would also have favorable policy implications. Absent such a
broad definition, for instance, an employer could "effectively insu-
late itself from the application of Faragher, and Ellerth, simply by
directing all critical personnel decisions to be effected by a person-
nel department, which may have no direct, and only infrequent con-
tact with the employee subject to the harassment."21 4 The court
therefore rejected the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of
employment" definition, instead adopting the broader "immediate
(or successively higher) authority" language employed in Faragher
and Ellerth.215
Applying this broader definition, the court noted several rea-
sons why the charge nurse should be considered a supervisor for
Title VII purposes. 21 6 First, the charge nurse was responsible for
"direct[ing] the day-to-day activities of the Staff Nurses[J dele-
gat[ing] duties to the Staff Nurses; . . . prepar[ing] employee per-
formance evaluations; and mak[ing] recommendations to the Direc-
tor of Nursing concerning the discipline of subordinate
employees."21 7 Also, the charge nurse used his supervisory status to
isolate the plaintiff from other employees so that he could assault
her.218 The court therefore held that the charge nurse qualified as a
supervisor for Title VII purposes, 219 even though he did not have
the authority to "hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline"
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 125-31.
213. See Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 972; see also supra text accompanying note 83.
214. See Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
215. Id.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 961.
218. Id. at 973.
219. Id.
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the staff nurse.220 It refused to grant Leisure Hills's summary
judgment motion.221
Several flaws exist in the Grozdanich court's reasoning.
First, the court incorrectly applied and misinterpreted the tradi-
tional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition. Cases
decided prior to Faragher and Ellerth did not require employees to
have the ultimate authority to make hiring and firing decisions in
order to qualify as supervisors; instead, the employees merely
needed to exercise significant control over such decisions. 222 Second,
the Faragher Court's application of the "immediate (or successively
higher) authority" definition is not as significant as the Grozdanich
court would suggest. In Faragher, Silverman had control over the
plaintiffs work schedule and her fitness training. Although he did
not have the power to fire the plaintiff, he likely would have been
considered a supervisor under the traditional "hiring, firing, or con-
ditions of employment" definition nonetheless. Pre-Faragher cases
such as Paroline clearly indicated that the power to control work
assignments will give an employee supervisory status under some
circumstances. 223 The Faragher Court's application of the "immedi-
ate (or successively higher) authority" definition, therefore, does not
necessarily indicate that the Court intended to overrule the tradi-
tional definition. Finally, because the Grozdanich court misinter-
preted the traditional definition, its policy reasons for expanding
the definition are unpersuasive. It would be economically unwise
for employers to place all supervisory employees on a personnel
committee with limited oversight of other employees. If lower-level
employees are aware that higher-level employees are not regularly
monitoring their daily performance, they will be tempted to work
less diligently. Widespread job shirking and the resulting decline in
production would likely cost companies much more in the long run
than the occasional Title VII claim. Thus, for economic reasons,
companies would be unlikely to organize their employees in the
manner the Grozdanich court suggests.
Another decision interpreting the Supreme Court's "immedi-
ate (or successively higher) authority" language to have broadened
the traditional definition of supervisor is Corcoran u. Shoney's Co-
220. Gordon v. S. Bells, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 966, 980 (S.D. Ind. 1999). These are the criteria
that the Southern District of Indiana noted were essential in determining supervisory status.
See supra text accompanying note 201.
221. Id. at 969.
222. See, e-g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993); see also supra
text accompanying note 65.
223. See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989).
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lonial, Inc.2 24 In Corcoran, the plaintiff, a dining room manager,
claimed that the restaurant's assistant manager sexually harassed
her.225 The court observed that "[ult is not always clear when a co-
worker becomes a supervisor."226 It then noted the vague "immedi-
ate (or successively higher) authority" definition articulated by
Faragher and Ellerth. 27 The court did not mention any cases prior
to Faragher and Ellerth, nor did it acknowledge the traditional
"hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition of supervi-
sor. Even though the plaintiff offered very little evidence that the
assistant manager had any significant control over the terms of her
employment, the court considered the assistant manager to be a
supervisor for summary judgment purposes. 228 The court found that
the plaintiffs claim that the "defendant discussed the work per-
formance of a Shoney's employee with her" was enough to establish
a genuine issue of material fact regarding the assistant manager's
supervisory status.229 The Corcoran decision is a prime example of a
court intentionally broadening the traditional definition, because
one conversation about another employee certainly would not have
been sufficient to establish supervisory status under the traditional
"hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition.
A significant number of district courts have held that the
Supreme Court intentionally broadened the definition of supervisor
with the Faragher and Ellerth decisions.230 As a result, these courts
have held a larger number of employees to be supervisors for Title
VII purposes. The reasoning employed by these cases is problem-
atic, however, because the Faragher and Ellerth decisions did not
reject the traditional definition of supervisor.
224.Corcoran v. Shoney's Colonial, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 601, 605 (W.D. Va. 1998).
225. Id. at 603.
226. Id. at 605.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 605 & n.4.
230. Other cases have also chosen to utilize a more expansive definition of the word supervi-
sor. See Quiroz v. Hartgrove Hosp., No. 97-C-6515, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4595, at *24.*29 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 24, 1999); Quiroz v. Ganna Constr., No. 97-C-0480, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1285, at *60-
*62 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 1999); Von Gunten v. State, 68 F. Supp. 2d 654, 661 n.3 (D. Md. 1999)
(citing Grozdanich for its reasoning behind who constitutes a supervisor).
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IV. APPLYING THE BETTER DEFINITION: WHY THE
TRADITIONAL DEFINITION MAKES MORE SENSE IN THE TITLE
VII CONTEXT
Courts should continue to use the traditional "hiring, firing,
or conditions of employment" definition of supervisor for several
reasons. First, the traditional definition leads to extremely positive
results: it fulfills the plain language of Title VII, and it furthers
beneficial public policy. Second, applying the traditional definition
demonstrates a commitment to the doctrine of stare decisis. Third,
the "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition is more
consistent with case law decided under the textually similar Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act ("ADEA").
A. Positive Implications of Retaining the Traditional Definition
Application of the traditional definition of supervisor will
have two practical benefits in future Title VII sexual harassment
cases. First, the traditional definition best fulfills legislative intent
by preserving the plain meaning of the term "agent" as used in the
statutory definition of employer.2 1 In addition, the traditional defi-
nition will ensure equal treatment for all types of employers, and it
will not deter employers from developing formal, practical employee
organizational schemes. 232
1. The Traditional Definition Better Fulfills Legislative Intent
The traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment"
definition more closely adheres to the plain language of Title VIi's
text. In Title VII, Congress expressly defined an employer as "a
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees.., and any agent of such a person."= Title VIis
definition of employer is important because it explains which com-
panies can be held liable under the statute. 234 By including the
term agent, it also delineates the category of employees whose ac-
tions may ultimately expose businesses to liability for sexual har-
assment.2 5
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
232. See infra text accompanying notes 272-80.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).




According to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, to be an
"agent," one must have the power to "alter the legal relations be-
tween the principal and third persons."23 6
No legislative history exists to further clarify Title VII's
definition of employer, but the traditional definition of supervisor
best fulfills legislative intent by preserving the true meaning of the
term agent. Under this definition, supervisors must have the power
to affect the employer's legal relations with other employees. By
exercising the power to hire (or to make hiring recommendations),
supervisors, as traditionally defined, can not only oversee the day-
to-day activities of lower level employees, but can also bind an em-
ployer into a legal employment relationship with a third party. A
traditionally-defined supervisor can also terminate the employer's
legal employment relationships by firing (or recommending the fir-
ing of) other employees. The "immediate (or successively higher)
authority" definition, however, is not necessarily limited in applica-
tion to those employees holding the power to legally bind the em-
ployer. In fact, it may implicate supervisory employees that will
never have this power. The traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions
of employment" definition at least ensures that employers will be
held liable only for the actions of employees who may properly be
described as "agents."
By choosing the word "agent" rather than "employee," Con-
gress expressly included a vicarious liability standard within the
text of Title VII.23 7 Congress clearly envisioned one of two possible
scenarios: courts would either hold employers liable only for the
acts of their agents, or they would hold employers more exactingly
liable for the acts of their agents. If courts adopted the former
choice, employers would never be held liable for co-worker sexual
harassment. If courts adopted the latter choice, however, employers
would face potential liability for sexual harassment by both co-
workers and supervisors, but plaintiffs would encounter an easier
burden of proof when suing for harassment by supervisors. Courts
have clearly chosen the latter of these two interpretations, because
employers can be held liable for the acts of the plaintiffs co-
workers, as long as the plaintiff satisfies a negligence standard. 38
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 110, § 12.
237. See Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., No. 95-C-4906, 1997 WL 182279, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8,
1997).
238. See, e.g., Gordon v. S. Bells, Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 966, 980 (S.D. Ind. 1999); see also Wil.
1am R. Corbett, Symposium, Faragher, Ellerth, and The Federal Law of Vicarious Liability for
Sexual Harassment by Supervisors: Something Lost, Something Gained, and Something to
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Meanwhile, courts have imposed more exacting liability, through
vicarious liability, for the acts of supervisory employees, or true
"agents."239
Both congressional intent and previous court decisions sup-
port a clear demarcation between the standards of liability for co-
worker harassment and harassment by supervisors, or "agents."
Courts should not begin to blur this distinction by including a
broader range of employees within the definition of supervisor. Be-
cause it more clearly fulfills the plain language of Title VII and is
consistent with subsequent case law interpreting the statute's defi-
nition of employer, the traditional definition should be retained.240
2. Practical Implications of the Traditional Versus a More
Expansive Definition
The traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment"
definition is also more desirable from a policy perspective. Broadly
construing the "immediate (or successively higher) authority" defi-
nition of supervisor exposes employers to an excessive, and perhaps
Guard Against, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 801, 811 (1999). Although this is the law in most
circuits, the Second Circuit has held that employers are vicariously liable for co-worker harass-
ment under certain circumstances. In Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., the Second Circuit held
that an employer could be held strictly liable for co-worker harassment if a supervisors "inac-
tion" furthered the harassment. Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766-67 (2d Cir.
1998) (finding for defendant corporation because plaintiff failed to show inaction on the corpora-
tion's behalf). This is not a significant departure from other circuits because those courts would
presumably hold employer "inaction" to be a form of negligence. The Second Circuit's law is thus
more a departure of form than of substance.
239. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
240. This Note asks courts to narrowly interpret Title VII but to broadly interpret the lan-
guage of Faragher and Ellerth. However, such interpretations are supported in part by the di-
rect language of Faragher, where the Court at one point simply assumes that supervisors have
the authority to hire, fire, and promote other employees. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 790 (1998); see also supra note 106. Looking broadly at the Faragher and Ellerth
opinions, the Court clearly takes the position that the employer is not necessarily liable for all
sexual harassment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; Ellerth, 624 U.S. at 765. For example, the
employer is not vicariously liable for co-worker harassment; instead, the plaintiff must establish
employer negligence. Additionally, employers are not liable for supervisory sexual harassment if
they can establish the two-prong affirmative defense. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; Ellerth, 524
U.S. at 765; see also supra text accompanying notes 122-24. Thus, the Court recognizes that
some forms of harassment are simply beyond the employer's control and should not lead to em-
ployer liability. This underlying theme in Faragher and Ellerth supports the use of the tradi-
tional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition of supervisor. The traditional defi-
nition recognizes that the employer can control, and therefore be held liable for, only certain
forms of sexual harassment.
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unfair, threat of liability.24' A broader definition would also deter
employers, especially those with large numbers of employees, from
adopting the types of formal employee organizational schemes
needed to maximize profits.
A more expansive definition of supervisor would effectively
punish employers for implementing such organizational schemes. 242
For example, assume hypothetically that Company X employs 2,000
people. Five hundred of these employees can be clearly classified as
upper-management possessing the ability to significantly impact
hiring,, firing, promotion, and demotion decisions. The remaining
1,500 employees work on a production line. Although each employee
may have a different task to accomplish each day, these 1,500 em-
ployees can safely be considered "co-employees," with no one em-
ployee possessing the ability to affect the employment terms of an-
other.
Suppose that Company X's management has noticed some
problems with intra-company communication. For example, several
pieces of production equipment have malfunctioned, but manage-
ment-level employees are not notified about the problems until sev-
eral days later. Management-level employees suspect the cause of
this delay is that line workers either do not know who to notify, or
are intimidated by management and therefore do not want to ap-
proach them. To improve communication, Company X decides to
restructure its employee organizational system. Management de-
cides to divide the line workers into groups of 50, and appoints one
"Team Leader" for each group. If an employee experiences complica-
tions with equipment, they should consult their Team Leader, who
in turn is expected to report the problem to management. Team
Leaders do not gain any additional powers or responsibilities; their
new role entails only the obligation to report problems to manage-
ment.
If, in the above scenario, a Team Leader sexually harasses
another worker in his or her group, Company X's standard of li-
ability depends upon which definition of supervisor a court employs.
Under the "immediate (or successively higher) authority" definition,
241. See Mackay v. Rayonier, Inc., No. 3:96cv1582, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21108, at *19 (D.
Conn. Aug. 31, 1999) (holding that looking to an employee's location on a company organizational
chart is inadequate and inflexible).
242. See Starkman, supra note 17, at 325 (noting that under a broader definition of supervi.
sor, employers may be held vicariously liable for co-workers with actual and apparent authority,
employees with fancy job titles like "group leaders", and managers with actual "dotted line" ro.
sponsibilities over the victim).
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Company X would probably be held vicariously liable for the Team
Leader's actions. Even though the Team Leader clearly has no in-
fluence over terms of the victim's employment, the Team Leader
can be considered to be an employee with "immediate (or succes-
sively higher) authority" over the victim. Under the traditional
"hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition, however,
the Team Leader's actions would not result in vicarious liability.
Because the Team Leader does not have the power to hire, fire, or
affect the conditions of the victim's employment, Company X will
instead be subject only to a negligence standard of liability.
This hypothetical situation raises a significant concern: com-
panies considering an organizational restructuring will be torn be-
tween improving production and communication-and thereby in-
creasing profits-and limiting exposure to Title VII liability.243 To
avoid liability, companies will be forced to approach such restruc-
turing in an informal manner. Using the above hypothetical, Com-
pany X may simply ask a few production line employees to report
any problems around the plant, rather than dividing the entire pro-
duction force into teams and appointing formal Team Leaders.
Treating employers with formal employee organizational structures
differently from employers with informal organizational structures
is logically inconsistent and plainly unfair. Courts do not need to
apply an inconsistent standard, though, because the traditional
definition of supervisor is an established, available alternative. The
traditional definition looks at the authority granted to employees
(i.e. substantial influence over hiring, firing, promoting, or demot-
ing) instead of their positions in the corporate hierarchy. The tra-
ditional definition thereby treats all employers equally, regardless
of their choices of internal corporate structure.
Critics may argue that the broader definition is desirable be-
cause more plaintiffs will be able to recover for sexual harassment,
and it will encourage employers to take additional affirmative steps
to prevent sexual harassment. Even under the traditional "hiring,
firing, or conditions of employment" definition, however, plaintiffs
with strong co-worker sexual harassment suits will continue to pre-
vail under Title VII. Admittedly, these plaintiffs will encounter a
negligence, rather than a vicarious liability, standard. Case law
subsequent to Faragher and Ellerth has proven, however, that
plaintiffs can overcome a negligence standard in co-worker sexual
243. See Mackay, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21108, at *19 (reasoning that employees may not be
directly responsible for lower-level employees, but may still have influence over job-related deci-
sions affecting those employees).
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harassment cases. 244 Because employers still face potential liability
for either co-worker or supervisory harassment, they will be also be
encouraged to implement and maintain sexual harassment policies
and training. The traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of em-
ployment" definition, therefore, strikes an even balance: it provides
employers equal judicial treatment and freedom to run profitable
businesses, yet it still allows plaintiffs to prevail in strong sexual
harassment cases.
B. Importance of Adherence to the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Another reason for retaining the traditional "hiring, firing,
or conditions of employment" definition of supervisor is the princi-
ple of stare decisis. Adhering to previous decisions, especially those
that remain logically sound, serves several purposes in the Ameri-
can legal system. First, when Supreme Court follows precedent, it
ensures that employers striving to comply with Title VII are treated
fairly.245 If employers were not liable for the actions of certain non-
supervisory employees before the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, it
would be inconsistent and unjust to suddenly classify those same
employees as supervisors today. Second, the doctrine of stare decisis
ensures predictability. 246 Employers should be able to rely on past
decisions that have clearly explained who is and who is not a su-
pervisor for Title VII purposes, allowing them to structure their
corporate hierarchies accordingly and preventing them from "fore-
seeing only the unknown."247 If courts give employers clear notice
of the law, they will be more likely to follow it. Third, adhering to
the traditional definition of supervisor ensures judicial efficiency.248
Case law interpreting and explaining the traditional definition is
abundant and easy to find.249 Developing and explaining a new,
broader definition of supervisor would essentially force courts to
"start again from scratch" resulting in a needless waste of judicial
resources. Moreover, by following precedent, the Supreme Court
retains legitimacy as a decision-making institution.250 As Justice
.Powell once noted, "elimination of constitutional stare decisis would
244. See, e.g., Williamson v. City of Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
Starkman, supra note 17, at 326.
245. See EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 174-75 (1994).
246. See id. at 175-76.
247. Id. at 175.
248. See id. at 178-79.
249. See supra Part II.B.
250. See HANKS, supra note 245, at 179-80.
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represent explicit endorsement of the idea that the Constitution is
nothing more than what [judges] say it is. This would undermine
the rule of law."25 ' Finally, maintaining the traditional definition of
supervisor will ensure public respect for future Title VII
decisions. 252
Of course, critics will correctly argue that courts do not and
should not always comply with the doctrine of stare decisis. Few
scholars would argue that judges should blindly adhere to clearly
erroneous precedent. 253 The traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions
of employment" definition of supervisor, however, cannot be consid-
ered clearly erroneous precedent. As stated above, the traditional
definition not only better fulfills legislative intent, but it also re-
sults in more favorable policy outcomes than a broader definition.
Other critics may ask why, if the Supreme Court wanted to
adhere to stare decisis, it used the "immediate (or successively
higher) authority" language in Faragher and Ellerth. Although the
Court failed to offer justification for its departure from the tradi-
tional language, this departure is more likely the result of judicial
carelessness than a conscious desire to overturn the traditional
definition of supervisor. Several arguments support this opinion.
For one, the definition of supervisor was not at issue before the
Court in either Faragher or Ellerth.24 The Court simply assumed
that the harassers in both cases were, in fact, the plaintiffs' super-
visors, and it perhaps did not even review existing case law articu-
lating the traditional definition. Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court
had little incentive to fully investigate lower courts' holdings re-
garding the definition of supervisor. Additionally, the holdings of
both Faragher and Ellerth utilized the proper standard of liability
for employers in hostile environment sexual harassment cases, and
the "immediate (or successively higher) authority" language is best
viewed merely as dicta clarifying that holding. Although it is ar-
251. These remarks by Justice Powell were made off-the-bench, not in a court opinion. See
id. at 179.
252. Importantly, courts are less bound by stare decisis for constitutional questions than they
are for statutory issues. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Sere., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989)
(noting that "stare decisis is a cornerstone of our legal system, but it has less power in constitu-
tional cases, where, save for constitutional amendments, this court is the only body able to make
needed changes").
253. See, e.g., HANKS, supra note 245, at 171-74. For example, one would be hard.pressed to
find anyone presently willing to argue that the Supreme Court should have relied upon the rea-
soning of P/essy v. Ferguson rather than handing down the watershed Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion decision. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
254. See Brief for Respondent in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 1997 U.S. Briefs 282 (1997);
Brief for Respondent in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 1997 U.S. Briefs 569 (1997).
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guably persuasive, this language technically is not binding upon
lower courts. The Court's failure to discuss the "immediate (or suc-
cessively higher) authority" definition is also telling. When any
court makes a conscious effort to overrule prior precedent, it usu-
ally does so expressly and offers lucid reasons for doing so.255 In
both Faragher and Ellerth, however, the new definition appeared
only once. Because the definition was not at issue, and because the
Court did not discuss the new definition or previously articulated
definitions in any detail, chances are slim that the Supreme Court
intended to overrule the existing, traditional definition of supervi-
sor.
C. Consistency with Case Law Decided Under Similar Employment
Discrimination Statutes
The traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment"
definition of supervisor is not only consistent with precedent sexual
harassment cases, but it is also consistent with other influential
case law. For example, other employment discrimination statutes,
such as the ADA and the ADEA, include definitions of "employer"
closely resembling those in Title VIJ.256 Because previous ADA and
ADEA cases have utilized the traditional definition of supervisor,
those cases are influential in determining the proper definition to
be employed in Title VII cases. 257
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA defines an employer as "a person engaged in an in-
dustry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees . . . and
any agent of such person."28 The ADA language, of course, is nearly
identical to the definition provided in Title VII and notably, both
statutes utilize the term "agent." 259 Although few ADA cases have
255. For example, in 1989, the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. that
Congress could abrogate states' immunity under the Eleventh Amendment when acting pursu.
ant to the Commerce Clause. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989). In 1996, the
Supreme Court overruled that holding. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996). In
Seminole Tribe, the Court spent roughly eight pages analyzing its holding in Union Gas Co., then
explained why that holding was incorrect. Id. at 59-68.
256. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir. 1995).
257. See Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and Struc-
ture ofA Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1476-77 (1994) (arguing that the ADA claims should be tried much
like hostile environment cases under Title VII).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
259. See Butler v. Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999).
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addressed the statutory definition of the term, at least one court
has held that an agent under the ADA is defined as an employee
having "significant control over the plaintiffs hiring, firing, or con-
ditions of employment."260
In Haltek v. Park Forest, the plaintiff sued the Village of
Park Forest after the chief of police discriminated against her at
work.261 The court noted that "the ADA's definition of employer
mirrors the definition in Title VII."262 The court then looked to the
Fourth Circuit's Title VII decision in Paroline in order to determine
which employees possess a level of authority sufficient to justify
holding the employer vicariously liable for their discriminatory
conduct. 263 The court adopted the traditional "hiring, firing, or con-
ditions of employment" definition articulated in Paroline, and it
held the village liable for the police chiefs discriminatory actions
against the plaintiff.26 4
Because the ADA is an employment discrimination statute
with a definition of employer nearly identical to the definition ar-
ticulated in Title VII, ADA case law discussing the definition of su-
pervisor or "agent" is not only relevant but also persuasive in the
Title VII context. Since most ADA cases have expressly adopted the
traditional definition of supervisor, courts interpreting Title VII
should continue to use that definition as well.
2. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The ADEA also includes a definition of "employer" closely re-
sembling the definition of the same term adopted in Title VII.2s
Under the ADEA, an employer is defined as "a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees
... The term also means (1) any agent of such a person."26 As with
260. Haltek v. Park Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802,804 (N.D. 111. 1994).
261. Id. at 803.
262. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1999) (noting that the definitions listed in the ADA
and Title VII are nearly identical and should be given the same meaning).
263. Haltek, 864 F. Supp. at 804-05.
264. Id. at 804-06; see also Carparts Distribution Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler's Assn., 37 F.3d
12, 17 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that the defendants in the case would constitute an "employer if
they exercised significant control over an important aspect of the plaintiffs employment).
265. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (7th Cir. 1995). The
ADEA is occasionally interpreted differently than Title VII. See id. at 1280 n.1. The ADEA has
incorporated some provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act C FLSA"), a statute that varies
greatly from Title VII. See id. The ADEA does not, however, incorporate the FLSXs definition
of employer. See id. (quoting Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 588 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993)).
The ADEA's definition of employer can therefore be used interchangeably with Title VII. See id.
266. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1999) (emphasis added).
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cases arising under the ADA, ADEA case law rarely addresses the
definition of "agent" or "supervisor." At least one case, however, has
adopted the traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment"
definition to define an agent under the ADEA.267
In Goodman v. Board of Trustees, an assistant dean claimed
that a college president passed her over for a promotion, instead
appointing a younger male with inferior qualifications. 268 The assis-
tant dean then sued the college under both Title VII and the
ADEA. 269 The court held that the president was, in fact, a supervi-
sor for purposes of Title VII because he had been specifically
authorized to make hiring recommendations. 270 The court also held
that the president was an employer or agent for ADEA purposes,
and it therefore refused to dismiss the assistant dean's lawsuit
against the college. 271 Because courts interpreting both the ADEA
and ADA have adopted the traditional definition of supervisor, Title
VII cases should similarly continue to apply that definition. The
three statutes have virtually identical definitions of employer, and
no logical reason exists for interpreting the three definitions differ-
ently.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, sexual harassment law has changed drasti-
cally. Prior to the Supreme Court's watershed decisions in Faragher
and Ellerth, 272 courts held employers vicariously liable only for the
quid pro quo harassment of supervisory employees. 273 When super-
visors engaged in workplace hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, courts held their employers to a simple negligence
standard.274 In such harassment cases, courts consistently defined a
supervisor as an employee with significant input into hiring or fir-
ing determinations or any other decisions affecting the conditions of
the plaintiffs employment.27 5
267. See Goodman v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. 524, 498 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
268. Id. at 1331.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1332.
271. Id. at 1336.
272. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
273. See, e.g., Highlander v. I.F.C. Natfl Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
274. See, e.g., Daulo v. Commonwealth Edison, 938 F. Supp. 1388, 1403 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
275. See, e.g., id. at 1401.
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The Supreme Court altered the existing standards of em-
ployer liability in its Faragher and Ellerth decisions. The Court dis-
regarded the quid pro quo and hostile environment labels, and it
held that employers can be held vicariously liable for sexual har-
assment by supervisory employees. 276 Several subsequent decisions
have suggested that the Court may have changed more than just
the standards of employer liability; they argue that the Court also
re-defined the term supervisor by characterizing it as employees
with "immediate (or successively higher) authority."2 7
Because the Supreme Court did not intend to overrule the
traditional "hiring, firing, or conditions of employment" definition of
supervisor, most courts have correctly continued to apply this defi-
nition.278 Other courts have utilized the expansive language of
Faragher and Ellerth.279 To resolve this apparent conflict, and for a
number of legal and practical reasons, courts should continue to
apply the traditional definition. By defining the term supervisor
more narrowly, courts best effectuate the plain language of Title
VII. The traditional definition also limits employer liability and en-
sures consistent application of Title VII. Moreover, the "hiring, fir-
ing, or conditions of employment" definition clearly adheres to the
important doctrine of stare decisis. Finally, cases decided under
other influential employment statutes with definitions of employer
closely paralleling the definition articulated in Title VII have simi-
larly applied the traditional definition.
Although questions regarding the appropriate definition of
supervisor have traditionally arisen in sexual harassment cases,
the issue could easily appear in other employment discrimination
cases arising under Title VII, including racial and religious dis-
crimination cases.280 Courts' resolution of this issue could therefore
have potentially far-reaching implications in employment discrimi-
nation law in general. By using a more precise "hiring, firing, and
conditions of employment" definition, courts treat employers fairly
and equally. The traditional definition also provides employers with
a clearer picture of the current standards of liability. If employers
obtain a clearer understanding of employment discrimination law,
276. E~lerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
277.See, e.g., Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 953, 973 (D. linn.
1998) (ignoring the traditional definition and applying the "immediate (or successively higher)
authority" definition introduced byFaragher and Ellerth).
278. See, eg., Parkins v. Civil Constructors, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998).
279. See, eg., Grozdanich, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 973.
280. See supra note 16.
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they will be more likely to follow that law. This result can only
place us one step closer toward achieving equality in the workplace.
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